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Abstract 
 
The connection between Big Data (BD) and law can be thematised in 
several ways. This article aims to contribute to the understanding of 
the different levels of interplay between Big Data, law and legal 
science. The paper firstly considers Big Data as the subject of legal 
regulation. Accordingly, it overviews the moral questions surrounding 
Big Data, BD’s predictive potential as well as the impacts of it on legal 
framework rules regarding privacy, data protection, competition and 
business regulation. The next section understands Big Data as a tool 
in the regulator’s and the lawyer’s hand. It discusses the new ways of 
‘Big Data-based social engineering’ as well as the creation of predictive 
tools and inferencing techniques based on Big Data in policing, law 
enforcement and litigation. Then the paper investigates the use of BD 
in legal science, thus the fourth section considers Big Data as a 
research tool. It seeks to explore the use of legal data-sets and textual 
corpuses as BD. In addition, it sheds some light on the wider impacts 
of statistical analysis, natural language processing, content analysis, 
machine learning and behavioural prediction on legal science. Finally, 
the paper gives some insight into the relationship between traditional 
doctrinal scholarship and the new types of BD-based research. 
 
 
Keywords: Big Data, Legal Regulation, Legal Science, Law-making, Prediction in Law, Data-driven 
Lawyering.
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1. Introduction 
 
The phrase ‘Big Data’ (hereinafter: BD or BD phenomenon) was born in the 
IT sector, and it was first described by IT (e.g. Ahlberg, 2011) and business journals 
(see e.g. Economist, 2010), and later in the seminal book by Mayer-Scönberger and 
Cukier (Mayer-Scönberger and Cukier, 2013). It later became a buzzword in the 
business sciences, sociology and public policy. Though it has influenced law and legal 
science, and the Mayer-Schönberger – Cukier book itself also devotes a whole chapter 
to the risks (practically regulatory aspects) of BD, still, the number of reflections in law 
is significantly lower than in the domains mentioned above.1 This paper aims to 
contribute to the understanding of the connection of law and legal science, on the one 
hand, and the BD phenomenon, on the other.  
The term Big Data is used in a rather loose way in the literature. Most of the 
sources are using, or at least are mentioning the ‘magic’ 3-4-5, ‘V’-s (Volume, Velocity, 
Variety, Veracity and Value) 2 as a definition. However this can hardly be considered a 
classical definition: it only gives the differenta specifica describing how Big Data differs 
from other ‘things’, (in the 3-4-5 ‘V’-s) but does not provide the genus proximum, (the 
family of phenomena to which the Big Data belongs). Does BD herald a new period 
in history? Or only a new era in the development of the information society? Or is it a 
new driving force that is changing our society? A new mindset? A set of attitudes? And 
if it is, what is the scope of this mindset? My definition in this article is a narrow and 
simple one: I use the term Big Data for the new (technical) ways, solutions and 
methods of producing, collecting, processing and using data, which together, as a 
driving force, might ultimately change the mindset, the attitudes, and all of society, – 
including the law. Big Data therefore initiates social changes, but it is not the social 
change, nor the new historical period in itself.  
A vast amount of data is generated on the internet every second by people and 
by machines (sensors). These data mainly provide information about people. (Data on 
natural phenomena, such as the data from the Large Hadron Collider or weather 
data, are sometimes also considered to be ‘Big’, but this aspect has no relevance here). 
It includes a whole range of data from the cell information, location and call 
(meta)data of mobile phones, the search strings typed into search engines, and click 
information on websites, as well as the data generated by sensors, smart meters, and 
online cash machines, or the millions of pages written and published by government 
officials, also known as ‘open data’ (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013: 116–118). 
It no longer represents an IT or a data storage problem, but a social phenomenon, 
since this amount of data not only requires different storage methods, handling and 
interpretation techniques, but can be and already is being used in totally different ways 
than ‘normal’ data. These new data-usage practices will have a severe social impact. 
Some aspects of this impact are already detectable, but some are still to come.                                                          
1 At Wiley alone, 30 books were recently available analysing BD in business, while there is no monograph 
in the legal field, although recently, HeinOnline contained some 180 legal articles. The White House is 
also very active in producing policy papers, reports, and other documents (see White House, 2012; 
White House, 2012c; White House, 2014; White House, 2015a; White House, 2016; NFS, 2015).  
2 For the three V-s: (Eaton et al., 2012: 5), for the four and five: (IBM Data Hub, 2016), but there are 
already sources who mention seven: (DeVan, 2016)  
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The aim of this article is to collect and systematise the arguments concerning 
the impact of BD on law (on legal regulation and lawyering) and its potential effects on 
legal science. My ambition here thus is not more than to collect and systematise the 
arguments, and insights from the available legal literature, and other influential 
resources – mainly from policy papers - that has a legal (regulatory) relevance, and 
partly to frame these issues and arguments. Hence, this writing is a collection of ideas 
and arguments, sometimes predictions and framings of leading authorities in the field, 
completed with my own observations. As with all predictions of this kind, those 
provided here are subject to mistakes. Finally, some of my observations and thoughts 
are purely descriptive, while others may have prescriptive elements, (like the ‘ethics of 
BD’ section).   
BD as a term appeared before 2010, but it became a popular subject of analysis 
only at the beginning of the present decade. This was the time during which most 
scholars realised that the mass production of data was a sign of deeper changes 
beneath the surface of society. Since then, hundreds of articles have been published in 
leading legal journals on different aspects of law and BD. Some of the papers have 
analysed BD in general, addressing questions such as the ethical problems raised by 
BD or its impact on data protection. Some other works have analysed specific 
problems arising from concrete well-known cases.  
The connection of BD and law can be thematised in several ways. I distinguish 
between the effect to law, and legal science. First I discuss the interplay between law 
(legal regulation) and BD. Here, a further distinction is made, whereby BD can be the 
subject of legal regulation, but it can also be a tool for better, ‘predictive’ law making 
and application of law and policing. After this, in the third section I will discuss the 
potential impact of BD on legal science. The following table illustrates the three 
domains of interaction between law, legal science and BD. 
 
Table 1. The role of BD in law and legal science. 
 BD as a subject BD as a tool 
Law  ❶ How should law frame, define and 
regulate the BD phenomenon? How will 
BD change existing privacy, data 
protection, competition, business 
regulatory, etc. rules? What will the new 
rules regulating BD look like? 
Methodological and theoretical (including 
ethical) questions about BD regulation, 
methodological and theoretical questions 
about using BD methods in law making 
and law enforcement. Moral dilemmas of 
prediction. 
❷ How can we exploit the new possibilities 
provided by BD in law making, policy creation 
and the application of law? How can we design 
new ways of ‘BD-based social engineering’? 
How can we create predictive tools and 
inferencing techniques based on BD in 
policing, law enforcement and litigation 
Legal 
science 
❸ BD as a new research tool in legal science. The use of big data-sets and textual corpuses 
as BD. How will these ‘super-empirical’ research methods change legal scholarship? What is 
the relationship between traditional doctrinal scholarship and the new types of BD-based 
research? How can we use statistical analysis, natural language processing, content analysis, 
machine learning, behavioural prediction, etc. in legal science?   
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2. BD as the subject of legal regulation 
 
2.1 Risks 
 
The first point of connection is that the BD phenomena visibly raises a whole 
range of risks that eventually must be handled in some way – also by the law. And BD 
– as Mayer-Schönberg and Cukier put it, are not only increased risks of the past, but 
the BD ‘changes the character’ of the risks, (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013: 
153). Regulators are facing a serious dilemma: BD offers new possibilities in business 
and government, but implies dangers that are not clearly foreseeable. The dilemma is 
present in policy papers and discussions, (White House, 2012; White House, 2016; 
FTC Conference, 2014) and within the literature (e.g. Tane and Polonetzky, 2012: 
63–69.) As usual, even the need for any, and especially any new regulation is 
questioned sometimes (Big Data and the Law Blog, 2014).  
As for the risks, the literature mentions the following interrelated dangers:  
1. Even in the case of data collected with the consent of the data-subject, 
because of the quantity of the data and its connection with other data elements, power 
is created on the part of the data-owner which is far beyond the normal data-
protection scenario. The classic example here is the Target case, in which a BD-based 
algorithm that processes the buying habits of customers figured out the pregnancy of a 
16-year-old girl (Duhigg, 2012; Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2012: 152–153). An 
aspect of this danger is, that within big databases, de-anonymisation can be relatively 
easily based on metadata and the use of certain algorithms (Ohm, 2010: 1718; Mayer-
Schönberger and Cukier, 2012: 154). On a wider horizon, as Tane and Polonetzky 
(2012) and Crawford and Schultz (2014: 94) have pointed out, nearly all categories of 
‘traditional’ data protection are being questioned, and especially ‘notice and consent’, 
data minimisation’ and ‘principles of purpose’ elements. For example, traditional data 
protection regulation is based on the consent of the person. But in the age of the BD, 
so much data is generated by a person that simply no one can control it. ‘Can you 
imagine Google trying to contact hundreds of millions of users for approval to use 
their old search queries?’ – ask Mayer Scönberger and Cukier. Or what ‘legitimate 
purpose’ of the data processing means, when ‘the most innovative secondary uses 
haven’t been imagined when the data is first collected’ (Mayer-Schönberger and 
Cukier, 2012: 153).  
2. There is a new phenomenon: the ‘predictive power’ of BD (McGregor et 
al., 2013; Siegel, 2013; Simon, 2014; White House, 2014; Ferguson, 2015; Jeon and 
Jeong, 2016). A company can look much more deeply than before into its customers’ 
habits with the help of BD, and based on that, it can exercise, for example, 
discriminatory practices. The problem has been discussed extensively in policy papers 
(White House, 2015b), as well as in a conference organised by the Federal Trade 
Commission in 2014 (FTC Conference, 2014). The FTC also detected another new 
BD-based risk, namely discriminatory pricing. Further, everyone is familiar with (and 
sometimes, does not like) the surge pricing of UBER, for example, which is also 
based on BD algorithms, and many people do not like it (Dholakia, 2015).  
It is quite normal, that when a new social phenomenon is forming, there is 
neither consensus about a definition among scientists and experts, nor any agreement 
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among regulators and stakeholders whether to regulate it or not, and if so, how. But it 
is also a common experience that eventually, the definition of the law will finally be 
much simpler – sometimes surprisingly so – than the definitions given by the experts 
or social scientists. It is likely that this will be the case with the BD phenomenon. I 
think, that from the legal, regulatory, ‘risk-centred’ point of view, the important aspect 
of BD is not the ‘four Vs’ or that it has been collected without explicit consent, but 
that there are huge data sets that have been collected with one particular purpose (or 
even generated spontaneously, without any aim), which are used for another purpose. 
The other peculiarity of BD is that, under certain conditions, one can make relatively 
accurate predictions based on it.  
BD therefore creates an information ‘super-power’ on the part of the data 
owner. A further problem is that these predictions are made by algorithms that are not 
transparent to the average citizen, and their inferences cannot be understood by 
‘common sense knowledge’. Most of the recommendations appear to be aimed at 
mitigating or compensating for this superpower, and they urge transparency 
concerning the algorithms and the decisions generated by these algorithms (Mattioli, 
2014: 537; EU Regulation, 2016: 13.2.f, 14.2.g). 
Therefore, this article opines that BD is primarily not a data protection 
problem. Traditional data protection regulations can be applied to the BD world, but 
they would deprive BD of its value-creating characteristics. The paradox is that the 
risks of BD are identical to its most significant value-creating power.  
 
2.2 Ethics of BD  
 
Traditional doctrinal scholarship can do little or nothing regarding the BD 
phenomenon, because there is not yet any regulation or jurisprudence in the field. So, 
in the case of BD and legal science, one must pursue other avenues, such as Richards 
and King (2014) who aim to establish the foundations for future regulations 
addressing ‘Big Data ethics’. As they stated: ‘We have some privacy rules to govern 
existing flows of personal information, but we lack rules to govern new flows, new 
uses, and new decisions derived from that data’ (Richards and King, 2014: 408). They 
lay down four high level principles. First, privacy will not be dead in the era of Big 
Data, but it should rather be perceived as ‘information rules’ than as ‘information we 
can keep secret or unknown’. They stated:  
 
Privacy should not be thought of merely as how much is secret, but rather 
about what rules are in place (legal, social, or otherwise) to govern the use of 
information as well as its disclosure (Richards and King, 2014: 411).  
 
Second, in the BD era, we must rethink our attitudes towards sharing personal 
information. Shared private information can still remain confidential, and that is what 
counts. Information always exists in intermediate states between completely public 
and completely private. We often share information with trust, expecting that it will 
remain confidential. The third ethical standard in BD ethics is transparency. 
Transparency, as the authors stated, ‘fosters trust by being able to hold others 
accountable’. According to the authors, BD practices should be as transparent as 
 74 ZSOLT ZŐDI  
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 3 (2):  69-87. 
possible, though they also admit that this will create a problem they call ‘a 
transparency paradox’:  
 
Transparency of sensitive corporate or government secrets could harm 
important interests, such as trade secrets or national security. Too little 
transparency can lead to unexpected outcomes and a lack of trust. 
Transparency also carries the risk that inadvertent disclosures will cause 
unexpected outcomes that harm privacy and breach confidentiality (Richards 
and King, 2014: 420).  
 
Finally, the fourth standard is the standard of identity. In the BD era, based on 
inference and predictive algorithms, governments, companies, and organisations can 
create a profile on us, and practically decide who we are, under which categories we 
belong, before we make up our own minds. There should be rules that empower us to 
define ourselves against the machine-made identity.  
There are some insights beyond these ethical standards. The first is that BD’s 
predictive and inferential power will enable the machines to make decisions that 
cannot be explained by our traditional narratives or justified by our ‘traditional’ 
justification techniques. And this problem is not solved by the rule that ‘meaningful 
information about the logic involved’ should be provided by the controller (EU 
Regulation, 2016: 14.2.g). Imagine that a machine makes a prediction that a certain 
group of men with a definite skin and hair colour, height, social status, and shoe size 
(just to be even more absurd) will commit violent crimes with a 90 per cent 
probability. Will the authorities stay idle? Or will they at least place these people 
under surveillance? And if they do, how this will be justified? How can any 
measurement be justified that is based on attributions that are not under the control of 
the person? How can the inference of a machine be justified that is not based on our 
‘normal’ moral narratives and ‘causal explanations’, but on some hidden 
interrelationships based on a huge amount of data? Let us just consider the terrorist 
dilemma (Brugger, 2000), assuming that the machine pinpoints a person who will, 
with 99 per cent probability, commit a terrorist attack. Will we do anything, and if we 
do, what will be the underlying reasoning? 
 
2.3 The dilemma 
 
If we have so many risks and fears, why should we not just put a ban on BD 
practices? First, because it is impossible, second because it is very inexpedient. Nearly 
all scholars agree that BD has an enormous value-creating potential. Byers (2015) 
pointed out five areas in business for which BD can create value.  
1. ‘Creating transparency to big data often exposes variability in performance 
and results, leading to changed behavior for more economic impact’ (Byers, 
2015: 758). This means that BD encourages economic performance.  
2. BD enables experimentation and gives direct feedback for different 
solutions, business models, and product-types. For example, Tane and 
Polonetzky (2012) discussed BD-based web-analytics as follows: 
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(W)eb analytics - the measurement, collection, analysis, and reporting of 
internet data for purposes of understanding and optimizing web usage - creates 
rich value by ensuring that products and services can be improved to better 
serve consumers (67).  
3. BD enables companies or organisations to segment populations in a very 
sophisticated way. BD can not only be a tool for marketers but also an excellent 
new basis for improved risk-management.  
4. In certain fields, human decisions (and human errors) can be replaced by 
BD-based decision-making.  
5. Big data enables innovations in business models or pricing. UBER’s surge 
pricing is an excellent example.  
 
BD as the most important driving force of the future economy is also present in 
policy papers both in the EU and in the USA. A recent EU document states: ‘Big data 
technology and services are expected to grow worldwide to USD 16.9 billion in 2015 
at a compound annual growth rate of 40 per cent – about seven times that of the 
information and communications technology (ICT) market overall.’ (Communication 
WP, 2014:2) The document mentions the smart grid, health, transport, environment, 
retail, manufacturing and financial services as BD areas (Communication from the 
Commission, 2014: 2). The White House also shares this optimism concerning BD: 
‘big data technologies continue to hold enormous promise, as the report identified—to 
streamline public services, to advance health care and education, and to combat fraud 
and complex crimes like human trafficking’ (White House, 2014).  
However, the value creation potential of BD prevails only if BD sets are 
disclosed. Mattioli (2014) argued that disclosure of the BD sets should be encouraged:  
 
Much of the rhetoric describing big data's potential for innovation assumes that 
data can be easily and meaningfully reused and recombined in order to 
examine new questions […] Most significantly, big data's producers tend to 
infuse their products with subjective judgments that, when left undisclosed, limit 
the data's potential for future reuse. […] These conclusions point toward the 
need for new policies designed to encourage the disclosure of big data practices 
(544, 549, 570).  
 
An important contradiction is apparent here. On the one hand, BD and BD’s 
predictive power create a dangerous imbalance and increasing vulnerability among 
customers. On the other hand, the BD on which these predictive algorithms are based 
represent huge potential and value-creating power. Some assert that BD sets should 
be disclosed in order to increase their value-creating ability. But disclosure will 
increase the vulnerability of private persons, and since some of the BD sets collected 
by private companies are some of their most valuable assets, they are not eager to 
share them with anyone else. One of the most serious issues in the coming years will 
be to find an equilibrium in regulation between the values of transparency and limited 
usage, and value-creating freedom of use.  
The EU’s approach to the BD phenomenon is apparently also controversial. 
As we know, the EU initiated the revision of the data protection directive (EU 
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Directive 1995/46/EC) in 2012 (European Commission Press Release, 2012); at that 
time, Big Data was simply not an issue or at least not in the recent narrative 
framework. The narrative of the EU during the revision was that the level of data 
protection should be increased and should be brought to the same level across 
Europe. According to the reasoning underlying the Regulation, a higher data 
protection standard would leverage trust, because ‘(b)uilding trust in the online 
environment is key to economic development’ (Commission WP, 2012: 7). I have 
doubts whether this argument is so simple. Creating higher standards can result in a 
higher level of trust, but at the same time it increases administrative burden, or can 
even create obstacles for the enterprises that want to exploit the power of BD.  
The Regulation contains only a few amendments with a connection to Big Data, 
and these amendments clearly show that this regulatory environment is not aimed 
primarily towards a ‘data-driven economy’. Let us take one of the most important 
fields of BD: regulation of automated decision making and profiling. There are two 
main rules in this field. First, ‘(t)he data subject shall have the right not to be subject to 
a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces 
legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her’(EU 
Regulation, 2016: 22.1), and second, the data subject has the right to obtain 
information about ‘the existence of automated decision-making […] and meaningful 
information about the logic involved’ (EU Regulation 2016: 15.1.h)) He/she is also 
entitled to ask for ‘human intervention’ (EU Regulation, 2016: 22.3) at any time. I 
have doubts if these rule can be aligned, and it is also unclear whether this will 
facilitate a ‘thriving data-driven economy’. Later, the case of two American legal 
information service companies are expounded, that are building their services on the 
liberal publication policy of American court documents. These services, in their 
existing form, simply would be legally impossible to build in Europe. But it is not only 
about data-protection rules. I already mentioned the connection between open data 
and the data economy. Despite all efforts, open data initiatives are developing slowly 
across Europe (Nicol et al., 2013; Open Data Maturity in Europe, 2016). 
Because of all these controversies, the contents of the future regulation cannot 
yet be ascertained. Will it simply amount to some new rules within the existing data 
protection regulation and for e-commerce, or will it change the whole regulatory 
landscape? Traditional data protection rules in the 1980s and ‘90s protected ordinary 
citizens against governments, and later, up to the present, against large companies. In 
this respect, BD has created a new situation. It is collected and used in a non-
transparent way, and it enables the data owners to make predictions and thereby to 
‘control the future’. But there is still too little evidence about this predictive power. It 
is unclear whether famous oft-cited cases (like the Target-case) are really the 
forerunners of incidents that will occur very frequently or if such cases are only 
accidental and isolated stories. We do not yet know whether the BD collected about 
us and our fellow-citizens/customers/parties will enable these organisations to really 
know even more about us than we know about ourselves. The other side of the coin is 
that it has also not been established that BD will bring about a new era characterised 
by a ‘data-driven economy’ (whatever this means). As long as the answers to these 
questions are unknown, we must be very cautious about designing new rules.  
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3. BD as a tool in the regulator’s and the lawyer’s hands 
 
Law is not just regulating, but can also rely on BD. As in many field of the 
business, healthcare, education and other sectors, it can also use it as a tool. In the 
field of law, however, we can differentiate between two levels of reliance: BD, on the 
one hand, can support law making and policy design, but on the other, it can be a tool 
in the hand of officials, lawyers, and judges in law application (lawyering), law 
enforcement and litigation.  
 
3.1 BD in law making 
 
In the field of law making and policy design, it is likely that better rules and 
regulations can be created with the help of BD: The EU also appears to adhere to this 
idea (H2020 Call, 2016). BD can open new perspectives in the preparation and 
design of rules, but also in the measurement of the effects of the amended rules. 
There is already a quite simple requirement that regulation should be based upon 
facts and data. (In Hungary for example this is also a legal requirement, since § 17 of 
the Act CXXX of 2010 on Law-making rules, that the law-maker should prepare an 
impact assessment on economic, social, budgetary, environment, safety fields – Act 
CXXX of 2010) For example, in planning VAT revenue it is important to know 
something about the gross retail turnover. If corporation tax is raised in the hope that 
it will bring in extra revenue, the number of companies and their profits should be 
studied. However, the possibilities offered by BD go far beyond this. In BD sets the 
data representing a certain social aspect is complete and available in real time. For 
example, the data generated by the online cash registers recently introduced in 
Hungary are the comprehensive and real-time set of data for the retail sector, and are 
not retrospectively collected or representative sample-based. The traffic information 
recorded by highway cameras registers every vehicle. The cell information from 
mobile phones shows the real movement of citizens, which is not distorted by the 
memory of the person who recalls it. Communications via social media show real-time 
human interactions.  
Therefore, BD can support law-making in several ways. First, the effect of a 
policy decision can be measured by data outputs, which show changes at the micro-
level. For example, a policy (law) change aimed at companies can be measured by the 
company register and the balance sheets or P&L statements published by companies. 
Second, in the era of BD, the initial data on which a policy decision is based are 
available in a complete and real-time format. The cases of the cash registers or the 
traffic information provided by highway cameras were mentioned above. At present, 
these data – if considered at all during law making – have been available only in an 
incomplete form, showing the past, not the present. Third, BD enables law-makers to 
experiment and to simulate certain policy decisions in smaller populations and to 
immediately measure the consequences of these decisions on certain outputs (for 
experiments with BD, see Byers, 2015). The acceptance of a decision or a policy 
change can be immediately monitored via social media, for example, or the increase 
or decrease of crimes via the information provided by CCTV cameras or information 
systems operated by the police. 
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3.2 BD in lawyering 
 
The application of the law (law enforcement, litigation, decision making, 
drafting of documents, etc.) can be supported by BD as well. This is a field in which 
there are existing examples. Lex Machina and Ravel are two functioning applications, 
both of which are based on BD.  
Lex Machina, which was recently acquired by Reed Elsevier, offers ‘legal 
analytics’ in three fields and argues that its software represents the ‘third leg to the law 
practice stool’ next to traditional legal research and legal reasoning.3 The product 
captures the litigation data and documents published in PACER,4 UPSTO,5 and 
EDIS,6 – all open data – then mines and analyses the data with the help of artificial 
intelligence software. This means that it extracts data from these documents (players, 
asserted properties, findings, and outcomes, including damages awarded, etc).  
The logic behind Lex Machina’s competitor, Ravel,7 is nearly the same. It 
extracts information from litigation documents with the help of natural language 
processing algorithms, which, at the same time, have the ability to engage in machine 
learning and visualise the results in a very spectacular form.  
Both companies can analyse individual judgements, areas of law, judges, and 
courts, and in certain areas, they can also do predictions on the outcome of a certain 
type of case, offer a certain type of language that has proven to be preferred by a 
particular judge, or plan a litigation strategy.  
So, the use of BD in this area is already a reality. But beyond its predictive 
possibilities, which is also a key element here, these services throw light on all the 
methodological questions on the interpretation of data as well. It is common 
knowledge that the interpretation of statistical data has raised methodological issues 
and can be the source of huge errors, even if the data collection is carefully planned 
(see e.g. the ‘McNamara sin’ mentioned by Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013: 
163–165). But BD has created many new problems, since the data collection is done 
from data sets which were not originally designed for that particular purpose. In the 
case of judgements and other free text documents, natural language further increases 
the possibility of misinterpretations and false conclusions. As Kris Hammond (2015) 
stated:  
  
                                                        
3 https://lexmachina.com/law-firms/  
4 Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) is an electronic public access service that allows 
users to obtain case and docket information online from federal appellate, district, and bankruptcy 
courts: https://www.pacer.gov/ 
5 The website and database of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: https://www.uspto.gov/ 
6 The website and database of the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC): https://www.usitc.gov/  
7 http://ravellaw.com/  
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Decision makers don’t want data. They want to understand what’s happening in 
the world. Data for the sake of data is a waste of time and money. Spreadsheets, 
visualizations, and dashboards fail because they may express the data, but they 
don’t communicate facts and the events in the world that gave rise to them. […] 
Likewise, the data associated with us as individuals, including the wealth of data 
from the emerging Internet of Things will be transformed into reports that real 
people will be able to read and understand. Rather than seeing data, they will 
see stories of their own lives mapped out for them based on artificial 
intelligence language systems looking at their data and explaining it to them 
(Hammond, 2015). 
 
If we just consider the ‘Judge analyzer’ service of Ravel, whose system promises 
to uncover ‘the rules and specific language your judge favors and commonly cites’ and 
to ‘pinpoint distinctions that set your judge apart’, the hidden narrative behind it is that 
using the language, the distinctions, the arguments, the concepts and sources a 
particular judge prefers, can help to win the case. An even further and deeper 
narrative behind this is that there is a connection between the quality of the reasoning 
and winning the case. This narrative is certainly not self-evident for continental legal 
systems, where the quality of the reasoning is often not determinative in legal 
proceedings – and sometimes of course this is not the case in the Common Law 
systems either.  
In the world of BD, it can sometimes turn out that our narratives – the big tales 
and the common interpretational frames – fail. What kind of narrative can be 
attached to the fact that a positive relationship exists between disgust sensitivity and 
political conservatism? (Inbar et al., 2011). How many such hidden interrelationships 
will be discovered that do not fit our existing narratives? Will BD be the next field for 
which we need to adjust our traditional narratives as we did after the development of 
quantum physics?  
 
3.3 BD-based application of rules  
 
If the predictive power of BD analytics is so powerful, is it not better to use 
these algorithms, which are based on real time, complete and detailed data, for 
example, to establish sentences in criminal cases to eliminate proven sentencing 
disparities? (Kunz and Majairan, 2016; Volkov, 2016; Windergren et al., 2016). Or is 
it not possible to use this power in civil law cases in which judges must interpret 
discretionary categories, such as a ‘reasonable time’ or ‘fair compensation’. Would it 
not be better to use BD-based algorithms to actually consider every detail?  
Outside the realm of the law, these BD-based decisions are already quite 
common. Just think about the scoring process used by banks when they decide 
whether to grant a loan, which is, in great part, based on data and algorithms. The 
process eventually ends with a number. The same applies to insurance companies’ 
risk assessment process. They have one thing in common: Applicants do not receive a 
justification after the decision. This is partly because the decision is based on personal 
characteristics that the applicant cannot change, and partly because the decision is 
made based on data-based algorithms, which either cannot be explained using plain 
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words, or it is not in the interest of the decision-maker to disclose the underlying rules. 
The European General Data Protection Regulation contains rules on automated 
decision making, but as I hinted above, this rule can be counterproductive and can 
hinder the EU from achieving a ‘thriving data-driven economy’.  
If this brave new world arrives, there will be several consequences. Just to 
mention two: first, imagine if sentencing was BD based. When creating the algorithms, 
the value judgements that until then, were hidden, would be explicit.8 In the case of 
sentencing, the goal of ‘special prevention’ (that the punishment should prevent the 
perpetrator from committing a crime again) and the goal of ‘general prevention’ (that 
the punishment should deter others from committing crimes) should be represented 
in the algorithm, and therefore, should be transformed into variables, which are made 
explicit.  
Another consequence could be even more interesting. The unity (or 
uniformity) of the decisions within a legal system is an important constitutional 
principle. We tend to think that BD-based algorithms will produce more uniform 
decisions, because the same algorithm can be used across the whole legal system. But 
the opposite could occur. BD-based algorithms, simply because they are able to 
examine and process far more considerations parameters and circumstances than a 
human, can make more diverse decisions. This brings us back us to problem #1: in 
these cases the two sides (two sub-principles) of the same principle, – the justice – are 
conflicting. The first says, that since there are no two similar cases, every case must be 
treated differently. But the other principle of justice says that ‘like cases should be 
treated alike’. There is a certain point, where the decisions of complex algorithms 
simply cannot be explained by plain human words, because they do not fit into our 
everyday narratives. In these cases it will be for us to decide to use these algorithms, 
and create a justification, or to ignore them and take back control over the decision 
process.  
 
4. BD and legal science  
4.1 BD as a ‘super-empirical’ method 
 
In many respects, BD-based research projects are not different from ‘simple’ 
statistical research projects, which are also based on great volumes of data, performed 
by computers, and use statistical and mathematical algorithms to process data. 
Nevertheless, BD has changed the landscape of the social sciences, and there have 
been extensive debates about how it will affect the methodology of social science 
research (Williford and Henry, 2012). It is far beyond the scope of this article to 
elaborate on the differences between the ‘old’ methods and the ‘BD’ methods. This 
article merely seeks to draw attention to some spectacular ones.  
The first involves the population being studied. In a narrow social domain, BD 
shows the whole picture, (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013: 22–31) and not a 
picture of a random or a representative sample. Normally, the domain under study is                                                         
8 An interesting example of making hidden value preferences explicit for the algorithm of an autonomous 
car is the ‘Moral Machine’ project by MIT: (http://moralmachine.mit.edu/).  
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smaller compared to traditional empirical research, and there are different distortions, 
compared to the previous research. If research is conducted on people’s movements 
based on the location data of their cell phones, this will use real-time and undistorted 
data, but will not show, for example, the aim of the movement, which would be asked 
in a survey.  
The second difference is that a statistical analysis is always preceded by a 
conscious and planned data collection process. The data collection is preceded by the 
data collection design (e.g. the drafting of questionnaires), and this is preceded by a 
hypothesis based on a narrative or a paradigm. Therefore ‘normal’ empirical research 
can never change the starting paradigm or narrative. It can falsify the hypotheses, and 
start the whole process from scratch, but it cannot change the paradigm itself. In case 
of BD research, the birth of the data precedes the research, and the researcher must 
somehow process and interpret the data after it has been created. Therefore, in BD 
research, if the hypothesis is falsified, one must rethink the paradigm as well. If the 
data does not fit into the existing narrative, one must change it or find another one 
(Deardorff, 2016).  
Third, it seems that because of the volume and complexity of BD, the 
visualisation and interpretative tools are far more important in presenting the results of 
BD-based research than in any other field. It is quite natural for statistical results to be 
presented in diagrams and not only in tables. But in the case of BD, the visualisation 
is not simply a way to better present the data, but sometimes the only way to present it. 
Normally, BD simply cannot be presented in its raw form, like, for example, a report 
on statistical research normally presents the survey questions and the dispersion of 
answers for every question.  
 
4.2 ‘Doctrinal’ and ‘empirical’ legal science 
 
How does all of this affect legal science?  
In the past few years, – as happened more than once in the last century of legal 
science – it has become one of the leitmotifs of the methodological writings 
concerning legal science that traditional ‘doctrinal’ scholarship seems to be in a crisis 
(Bodig, 2015; Dyevre, 2016); one of the escape routes could be empirical, data-based 
research, through which legal science could become a ‘real’ social science.  
To understand the problem, we should first clarify the relationship between 
‘traditional’ legal science and ‘empirical’ science, which is considered to be ‘real’ social 
science, and the further difference between the ‘old’ empirical methods and the new 
method offered by BD in the legal domain.  
Legal science’s traditional role, which is sometimes called ‘doctrinal’, or in the 
German-speaking parts of Europe, ‘dogmatical’, ‘ranges between straightforward 
descriptions of (new) laws, with some incidental interpretative comments, on the one 
hand, and innovative theory building (systematisation) of the other’ (Hoecke, 2011: 
vi). Regardless of how innovative it is, doctrinal science always analyses texts, namely 
some important texts in the framework of normative concepts, which is partly 
established by the text of the laws, partly by judicial practice, and partly by legal 
scholars.  
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Empirical research, on the other hand, is centred on social, and sometimes, 
psychological ‘facts’. Further, research can be empirical without using data or bigger 
samples, so there are additional (narrower) categories of research methods, namely 
those which are ‘data-based’ and ‘statistical’. The former uses numbers and variables 
to describe certain social phenomena, and the latter relies on representative samples 
and statistical methods such as dispersion and correlation, and standard ways of 
segmenting a population.  
Therefore, the different types of research in the legal domain are the following:  
 
Table 2. Different types of legal research. 
 Methodology and 
conceptual network 
Observed object Observed 
population 
Reliability of 
prediction  
Doctrinal Desktop, using an existing 
normative, legal conceptual 
framework 
Manifestations of the 
normative object – texts 
Some 
‘important’ texts  
– 
Empirical Based on sociological 
methods, using social 
science methods, sometimes 
based on ‘numbers’ using 
concepts of social science 
and mathematical methods 
Objectivations of the 
social phenomena 
and/or texts, or data 
taken on social 
phenomena and/or data 
taken on texts 
Accidental 
selection of 
social facts.  
Low 
Statistical Based on representative 
data, using concepts of 
social science, mathematics, 
and statistics 
Data taken on social 
phenomena and/or data 
taken on texts 
Representative 
sample 
High 
BD 
based 
Mathematical methods, 
narratives and conceptual 
framework employed 
retrospectively  
Data sets, in most of the 
cases, huge text corpuses 
processed as data 
The total 
population/data-
set 
Very high 
 
For the same research question (for example, ‘how has medical malpractice 
litigation changed in the last five years, and what are the future trends?’), there are five 
possibilities to elaborate the topic. The doctrinal research will comprise the reading of 
the most important higher court decisions and the analysis of the conceptual 
framework within these documents. An empirical study can include a questionnaire 
completed by counsels and judges active in the malpractice field. Data-based research 
can complete this with data connected to medical malpractice, for example, the length 
of the court procedures or the damages paid by hospitals. A statistical enquiry would 
conduct all of them using representative samples. Finally, the BD-based research 
could include complete data-sets, such as the whole aggregation of hospital and 
litigation documentation, which can ‘say’ anything about malpractice litigation.  
Why is the situation of the legal domain special? Empirical legal research is 
always in a very strange, in-between situation for two reasons. First, the social facts it 
observes (such as the ‘behaviour of judges’ or the ‘medical malpractice’ itself) are 
based on normative constructions (the ‘judge’, the ‘malpractice’). Any empirical 
research in the field of law requires – beyond the general social distinctions such as 
gender and age – these sets of normative concepts. While it seems, that these concepts 
are much more stable than social ones, as they defined in legal sources, this is not 
entirely true. They are, very frequently also fiercely debated, – like many 
constitutional concepts recently in Hungary: including the concept of ‘rule of law’ itself 
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– and they are also subject to regulatory and interpretational changes too. This result, 
that any BD research in law will be the subject of not only general interpretational 
doubts, well-known from social science, but will be debated by the ‘traditional’ 
doctrinal scholars as well, using ‘traditional’ conceptual arguments. Second, empirical 
legal research should very often (though not always) rely on, process, control and 
interpret texts. This is true for ‘normal’ empirical research (such as research on the 
attitudes of judges), but it deeply pervades empirical research projects that are based 
on text analysis. These ‘text-empirical research projects’ can be subdivided into two 
types: projects that are based on human reading and coding (See for example, the 
famous Supreme Court (Spaeth) database,9 or the European Conreason project10 and 
projects based on machine processing (see e.g. Fowler et al., 2007; Ződi, 2015). In the 
case of the manually coded research, it is quite clear that coding sometimes requires 
interpretation and partially arbitrary decisions, but even in the case of a machine-made 
analysis during the construction of the text-analysing algorithms, one must make 
certain decisions which can distort the data collection itself.  
These two peculiarities mean that BD-based research projects in law will not 
supersede doctrinal efforts; rather, they will rely on them. Doctrinal scholarship will 
provide the theoretical framework, the concepts and the distinctions that will serve as 
a basis for the higher narratives on which empirical and BD projects can build. But 
eventually, there will be a reverse process as well. BD research projects can offer new 
insights and ideas for which doctrinal scholarship can begin to build new theories and 
narratives.     
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Big Data already has a severe impact on law, and raises serious dilemmas. 
While Big Data is often mentioned as the basis for a new economic order, it is 
increasing risks, (mainly on privacy and anti-discrimination fields), which are different 
in character than ‘normal’ privacy issues (Mayer-Scönberger and Cukier, 2013). This 
new scenario means the 1. unmanageable volume, velocity, and movement of the 
(personal) data, that we and our devices generate, 2. the predictive power of the data 
which is resulting in an unbalanced relationship between private persons and those 
having access to the data and 3. the secondary use of the data, i.e. where the 
aggregated data is used for purposes that are far from their original ones. Keeping or 
tightening the existing (data protection and other) standards does not seem to be 
working, because this deprives society and the economy of Big Data’s value-creation 
power. New rules are needed soon, based on new ethical principles.  
BD offers possibilities in law making, lawyering and legal science. Experimental 
law-making, predictive lawyering and policing, legal enforcement based on data, and 
in-depth analysis of cases, fields of law, judges and courts will soon become parts of 
legal practice and will play an increasingly important role in the coming years. This 
does not mean that the political element in law-making or the moral judgement in 
legal decision making will disappear. It is rather that the foundation and the reasoning                                                         
9 http://scdb.wustl.edu/  
10 http://www.conreasonproject.com/ 
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structure of law making, lawyering and legal science will start slowly shifting to the 
direction where arguments based on Big Data will be accepted, and used more and 
more. Traditional legal science will also stay with us. But it will be controlled and 
complemented with the insights of (open) data-driven research. 
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